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SPEECH CATEGORIZATION AND THE
LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT
FORMALISM:
LESSONS FROM NIKE v. KA

INIRODVUCiON

A famous drawing, waggishly entitled "My Wife and My
Motherin-Law" can be perceived as depicting eilher a coquettish

young woman or an ugly old hag) Nike's allegedly false and misleading statements about working conditions in its overseas factories2 present the conceptual equivalent of this picture: Viewed
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from one perspective, these statements appear to be commercial

specch, while looked at from another angle, they secm to part of a
public debate on a matter ofpublic concern.
cogniin this ambiguity, Uniied States Supremee CoUrt Justice Stephen Breyer exclaimed during Oral argument: [Tl he truth of thelmatter is think
it's both. T ey're both tring to sel their poduct and theyre trying t make a statement that's relevant to a public debate,"t
Responding ila way typical of lower courts faced with hard
free speech cases, the Ca!lfornia Supreme C ourt in an opinion by
Justice Joyce Ke nn
attempted to extract a verbl
aformula from
relevant United States Supreme Court preee
that
uld determine the proper classification of the speech in question. 4 Under
the formula s divilned, the majority Concluded that Nike's allegedly false or misleading statements were properly catcgorized as
commercial speech. and thus were entitled to no Fir st Amendment
protection.6 Similarly purporting to rely on Supreme Court pr €edent, but reaching the opposite concusion, Justice Janice Brown

found that Nike's speech w as -more like" non-commercial speech
than commnrcial speech,7 and thus concluded Nike's speech was
Comurt
grntn
P""!
e" and hearin argument the Wned NtAM Supre
metor dsmissd
the wnti of emrani r a impro! idently grante~d. apparentls o n yurisdiytional grundhs. Nike. !Inc
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entitled to rig0rous First Amendment protection., Prominently
missing from both opinion', however, is any serious examination
of the underlying
i
alues served by the First Amelndrment's protection of spedeh.
In a typical free speech case, such use of verbal formu ae or
case matching to determine the category in whih to place the
speech in qusion works well enough. There is often precedent so
factually sirmilar hat it really is controlling; or even in the absence
of such truly coitrolling precedent, categorizing the speech in
ques tion one way rather than the other so clearly promotes the val-

ies undelyi1g resespeech d octrine that a judge can intuitively

make he right choice. But in a case Such as this, where there is no
case directly on point and the intuition of informed observers is
pulled equaly in both directions, any attempt to derive the answer
through such verbal formulae or case matching is at best futile, and
at worst a cover for a decision based on some irrelevant or even
som illegitimate consideration For, as Ronald Dworkin (paraphrasing Kant) has aptly explained: -analogy without theory is
blind."
Iln this article, I will attempt to fill the lacuna left by the California Supreme Court by focusing on preci sely what fre speech
values are implicated by the application of California's false adverising regimei" to Nike's speech. To this end, I will first descrbe the overall structure of American fre speech doctrine and
then suggest what values best explain this structure. I will next
inquire to what extent the application o f Calilforiia's legal regile
oeci!!al speec

uti les p rotet ioni than nonco0mme~rcial spech.
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thlreatenls these nlormls. WeC will then be in a position to determuine
the appropriate level of F irm Amendment protection for Nike's
speech.
I. FREE S LC . DE IORA

, AND N:B1R DISCOUIRsE1

To sensibly apply any legal doctrine, one needs a irm understanding of its purpose and underlying values. This is particularly
tre in no l cases such as thi in whcOh established doctrine supplies no mechanical answer Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court has done a poor job of explicating the purpose and
underlying values of free speech doctrine. Consequently as the
Cai fornia Supreme COurt did in this cas e l0wer cou rts Often
thraSh about aimulessl trying to find guidringprinciples in novel
free speech cases.
N the t pical free speech case there is no necess"ity, to appeal
to first principles in order to reach SOund resul
As JIdge
Learned Hand long ago wisely admonished, free speech doctrine
should be built on rules that are -hard. onvmntional, difficult to
evade.~ Inl the [Last thirty- years, the SupremeC Court hlas' followed
this advice and constructed a forvmaistic free speech doctrine that
is often capable of mechanically supplyin correct answers as
measured by these uiderlying values. It has dOne this primlariily by
devising a tw-track system under which "content-based" restrictions are eXtr emely sWspect and rarely survive constitutional challe nge, while coMntent-neutral ltaws are preSUmptively consti tutional and are rarely invalidated) ' As we shall see, however, althougLh this system works well enough in rn-of-the-milH cases, it
is ionetheless built on an illusion. For there is in fact no geneal

rle againm content discriinnation, and sometiies co nt!nt-neutral
laws are invalidated beCause they are inimical to basic free Speech
normis.

I wanti to emphasize at the outset that my ainalysis here is primlan!lY descriptive. I will offer what I believe to be the bst exPaLatrliersions ofttis descri pnon olfthe stret ure and values o1t\mneaetn 're
e speech
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nation of American free speech doctrine as it is, not what it Should
be. Wh atover might be sid in favor of a free spech system that is
primarily in ser ice of a diverse marketplace of ideas or a broad
colnceptionl of ind ividual liberty, neither of these alue S is the best
explanation of the basic normunde rlying American free speech
doctrine as it now stands. Rathe as
shal see, the peculiar pattern of American Nfree speech doctrine, under which some speec is
highly protected while other speech may be freely regulated, is
best explained as sering the core democratic precept hat, in dealing with us in our capacities as the ultimate governors of' society,
government must treat us as equal and rational agents.
A. ITle Basic Struictu1re of"Imericaln Free SpeCh(/ Duocime
ad the Protectio (ofPbie Discorse

Te leitmoti of cnempo y free speech doctrine is is hostilitY to content discrimination, especially view point discriminlation, which the Supreme Cour has condemned as the most "egLre
gious" orm of content discrimination' Viewpoint discriminatory
regulations are thosethat target "the specific motivating ideology
Or the opinion or the perspective of the speaker." An example of
such a regulation wOuId be one that forbad anyonle from saying
that abortion wa s murder or that blacks are inherently inferior to
whites.
This strong protection against content regulation, however,
does not apply across the board to all human utterances in whateVer cOte they may occur To begin with, there are familiar content-based exceptions to Firt Amendment protection, including
"fighting words"" (e.,

face to ace insults) obscenity,

child por-

nographyj and threatOs)
It is often mistakenly believed that if
expression does not fall into suCI a traditionally unprotected Category of speech, governmnent is fo rbidden from regulati ngth COntent of the speech in question absent a compelling r ason., This is
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demonstrably not the case. Rather as Robert Pos has persuasiely argued, the vitually absolute protection against contentbased discrimination applies only within the do main of 'public
discourse
that is, to expression on matters of public concern in
settings dedicated or esential to democratic selfIgovernance such

as hoks, magazines. films, the Internet, Or in public forMms "uch
as the speaker' corne ofthe park. It is in this realm that the people, the ultimate source of political authority in a democracy. can
freely examine and discuss the rules, norms, and conditions that
constitue society.
Within this realm, every proposition is open to question. For
if government were allowed to manage the content of this discussin, eithe by excluding certain ideas as wrong or offlensive, or
even by se ting e agena,
e opinion formed by public discussion would not reflect tie independent wfll of the people, but
would rather reflect the preferences of those temporarily entrusted
to govern society. 2 In this realm, even the most minimal of civility norms may not be entorced for fear that such regulation Will
inevitably reflect cultural or poiical norms of some par-ticular
community, wten it is these very norms that ar up for question 3
In addition, a spea er must be allowed to use wOrdS Or symolIs Of
the speaker's choosing. even highly inflammatory ones, lest the
resolution of specific controversies, as Nwel as the entire democratic process, seem illegitimate to that speaker.' 4
However, precisely because public discourse i the Ihited
States is so strongly protected, the realin dedicated to such expression cannot be conceived as covering the entire expanse of human
expression,2
Just as it is imperative in a democracy to have a
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realm in which any idea can be questioned as vituperatively as the
speaker choose, there must bhe other domains in which government may efficiently carry out th reSults yielded by the democratic process. Thus, in set.tinugs dedicated to some purpose other
than public discourse, such as those dedic ated to effectuating governinent programs in the government workplac,
instruction in a
public school classroom, 2 ' or the administration of justice in the

co urtroom
government has far greater Ice ay to regulate the
content of speech.2
Some have argued tHt te settings in which governmen may
regulate the content of speech are confined to those in whilc the
government is acting as a proprietor or educator, rather thatn in its
So" ereign capactyi Contrary to this iiew. the occasions in Which
the goernment, actinig as sovereign, regulates the content of
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speech are both manifold and uncontroversial.
The government
thus routinely regulates wiw ut First Amendment hindrance the
content foimmercial and financial speech through laws against
and other deceptive business
fase or misleading advertising
pract ices; controls what may be Said aboUt the value of stock;3
prohibits competitors sharingprice information; and, throuhi the
copyright laws, restrains the publication of infr ingnmateial) 6
More controversiall. the First Amendment seemingly allows the
government considerable leeway to regulate sexually or racially
harassin g speech in the private workplaeo.
This pattern of higly protected speech within public discourse and readily regulable speech outside that domain is perhaps
moststarkly apparent with re spect to Fi rstAmendme it
limitations
on defamation suits When allegedly defamatory speech concerns
a public official or figure, sringent FirSt Amendment protection
applies; 6 siinlarly, even when the sPeech is aboIt a private person, considerable First Amendment protection is available if the
speech is on matter of public concern.3 9 But if the Speech adI
e i,I
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dresses a purely private concern, no First Amendment limitations
restrain the normal operation of defamnation lawi 0
This special constitutional immunity for speech on matters
of
public concern was recently extended to thle criminal lawN inl Barnicki v. opp)erj which involved a federal La making i t a crine
to int rcept cell phone conversations, or for anymoo to publish the
coentas of such a conversation if that person had reason to know
that the conversation had been illegally intercepted"
TIhe Supreme Court held that because the illegall y intercepted conversation at issue in thal Case was "truthfl inforInation Of public concern," it was unconstitutional to impose either civil or criminal
labilit on "oleone (not invored with the illegal interCept) for
publishing the contents of the conversation.
The Court noted,
however, that such immunity might not attach if the conversation
4
was ofpurely private concern. I;
It is not just the content of speech, however, that determines if'
speech wiilbe considered highly protected public discourse the
setting in which speech occurs is Also cucial. Suppose a pharmacist erroneously writes instructions on a bottle of prescription
medicine and the patient gets sick No competent lawyer defending the pharv acist in a neglgenc suit would even think about
raising a First Amendment defense. Now assume that a gourmet
cookbook contains a recipe calling for wild mushroons, but the
al-thor does not carefully specify hw to) diS1tinguish the poi sonous
mushrooms froni thel ummy ones and someone ges sick from folowing the recipe. Here, althou gh a vry si mila halm has bee n
caused, I think that the publisher of the cokbok sued for this i njury could raise a quite serious First Amendmeni defensei- The
difference, I suggest, is that unhke books, m edicine labels are not
a medi.m essential to public discourse.

1 32 U.S 514 (20O0).
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In summary, the popular view that A content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless thle
speech falls Wthin some unprotected category is not an accurate
snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. Speech is too ubiqu itous
with too many real world consequences for there to be any such
rule. Rather, the string presumption against content discriminaton opeines only wthin a limited (albeit extremely important)
domnain.4 6
B. Democratic SelGover1nne anld Free Spch
What values give American free speech doctrine its particular
shpe. including its intense hostility to viewpoint discrimination
and its special solicitude for speech on matters of public concern
occurring in particular settings or mediba Despite attactive normative argumentl by such distinguished commentators as Professors Martin Redish and C Edwin Baker," is pattern shows that,
as a descriptive matter, a comnnitnent to sel f-realizatioin or selfexpression cannot possibylie at the core of the First Amendment.
Indeed as Professor Redish readily admijs, a constitutional COmmitment to the "development ofthe individual's powers and abilities" or to "thie individual's control of his or her own destiny
throuLgh making life-affecting decis Oins

!i
is

inconsistent with t le

entire Concept Of "unprotcted speeCh," such as obscenity and
fightingwodsL
SSee iJAI S WiV
INS
\Ii I\ -uprot 14, at:4-48

of
g;'ieain
Ofic2I

Pohr
ii<s,N.iY. RFY.VBoO K,SOct

.iYs[ha[

all coiini.

t's

principl: and the exceptis most be

on spech, are ban1i

dinsulte d, one by one a sPecial

I,Ie
I~oRod
OworIn TheLwi,

17 2996,
1
at 2i n 15 ("(onsittio6na a

But th e ?a
st n inge offacts o f Speech tha t arie plainly not pto-0

ecdbsteirt'nedenmasit analvttcallycl~earer to say that it prot-ected speech that s
L

thiat

II'd, a'i.

\t

BAKER. I

IIM I J IE I,

FRFF DOM OF:,O
SEEC

3;
i:
419891 targuing

libert thory pto ,4ide
s ":the most coh eent tmderstaaiiig of the first amenent")i~i~: Mainii

I Redish, The ,
of Tre SpaI I 3;4. Pi. ) 1REv. 591 595 (198t1
Ioe
re aaown is the m ol
ic -ale
Iirtheeby free speech)

~ Id. at 593-O
protctio
iFir

(agut'itat
g

sel

RediSh cont-inue s

of free spteeh,

t

is lkkeihaithe Cour's appoach to nImerous :isues of

AmndienIt 1on0imettoit
1ot
stould have to change

ile

ssoevel' concept of

speech.
!is

htc re o gni~zeS a sublet e of speech inrth
d 101 o onMstit io,
l
prthcti0w tolddhave to be aban~doned4. . Oce tine rco{gniZes thatthe pi mar salue
of free speech is as a means of fosteinindvda eeoien n iigtemk
ing of life aM-,ffecin deiions t inappropriatenes
aue of'diffeent types of"spe

becme

clear

f distingiing betw e en t he

Id. at 625.
Moroet it woui~
ld be anomalou toS
posit the existence of such a broad funuda mental liblib!erty:interest :in its :subistaniv e due :proceess :jurispru:dence,:as thougin :byt:he i:nmal scriny
:i::::::
applie d to laws piohbiting theitermiiinally, ill fr-om obtaiing assi stance inendin~gtheihlis'es at

SPfJCJ
(A
/

my

GRCIO

N

Another popular candidate for the lundamental norm underlying the Ameican fre speecI principle and one particularly relevant to the inquiry here is the sarch for1 ruh in the marketplace
of ideas. 0 whiie doLIbIess a value that info s
erican free
speech doctrine, it is surely not the basic value. Otherwise, the

First A endment would no t let the go vernment distort temmarketplace of ideas thr-o u gh prop aganda, aS it does anytime we are engaged in a war Nor would the First Amendment allow the government to suLbsi dize pro-denocracy speech or speech promoting
racial tolerance wh1ile re fusing' to fund pro-CommuniSt Or racist

speech. Anot her fu ndaImntema I shortco mi o'f tihe ma rketpl ace o f
ideas rationale is hat the eni premise that fre trade in ideas will
lead to the discovery of truth is highly contest able:
th ieo
hi tocosn.Ws.v
~ul.br.5 .. 72(97.Anotheri fundamental def-ct with the[
e-reahattion rheorl is that it ftfai to suiport fr'ee speechl as an independen~t
principle Rathier, under this theory, free speech is enirtely subsumred by this broaider berty
pil IRcp
l
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But the most significantflaw with the marketplace of ideas
deorwy as an explanation of current American free speech doctrine
is that it justifies free spech
that is, in terns of the
good that it produces foWr sociely as a whole. But free speech has
long been understood in the lnited States aS an individual right!'
oljus as a means of promoting social welfar . Professor Baker
is thus surey correct to conclude that the "marketplace of ideas
theory, is fundamentally unsound both normatively and descripSinilar problems exist with variations on the marketplace of
ideas rationale, su ch asAlexander Me iklejohn's, which sees the
essence of the free speech principle as assuring that people have
acces to a broad SPeCtrum 0 ideas so that they can vote wisely.
ACcording to MNeikle ohn, the First Amendment does not require
that "on every occasion, every citizen Shall take part in public debate. . .. What is essential is not that eeryo ne shall speak, but that
eerything worth saying shall be said
if al broad-ba sed bety

,
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theory of fee speech proves too much. then Meiklejohn 's vx
proves too little. For this instrmental, listener-based theory does
not account for the right of an individual speaker to voice his view
in public discourseI regardless of how often that view has been
stateddbefor- 7 No matter how man tinies we hae all heard the
message that Osamna bin Laden is evi, I still have a right to voice
that view in public discourse.
Stil, as flawed as Meiklejohn's theory is, he was on to som ething important in attempting to tie fee speech to denocracy. But
to explain the intensely individualistic nature of American free
speech doctrine, we need to look to the
foundationnu nderlying
the American concept of democracy. What we find is a moral
view about the p ope rehlationship bet ween the state and the individua l a precept reflected in the Declaration of Independence and
the Enlighteniment philosophy that influenced that doCumeni.
)ItOn
this view, the goverment I ust treat each of us, in Our capacities
as the ultimate sO Irce of pOl itical auth0 rity, ase qua aInd rationlal
age nts.
It follows froim this precept that each Peison has a Hht to Ity
to persuade others about any matter of public concern; for if govemninent prevents a speaker froI participatinggin public discourse
b caIse it dislikes or disagrees with the speaker's w\orldview, it is
not treati ng the speaker equally with other citizens Siilarly, if
the state stops speech because it believes that the people may be
persuaded to impIeme nt some unwfVise soCial p oCy,, it in1Sults ushby
de nyling our rational capacitie Si
This precept Is radically egalDisie
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tarialn in the form al sense of the terml. It is also deeply individualistc, for as Ronald Dworkin has explained, free speech is not
merely instrumental to demiocracy it is constitutive of iti"
In a related vein, Robert Post believes hat pubic discourse is
an essentia part of democracy because it "engenders the sense of
participation, identification, and legitimacy necesary to reconcile
individual wth colective autonom" t On this view, an ndividual denied participation in the dialogue that forms public opi nion
could (and indeed might) rightly feel that ony public policy decision taken as a result oft'hat opinion is illegitimate.
The norm, then, that best explains the American free speech
principle is a commnitmlent to democratic self1-g-ov ernanlce, not in
the instrumental sense described by Mei kl john, but rather as an
individuwl right to freedom from governmental regulations that
unduly inhibit free and equal participation in the dialo1gue hat
forms the 'public Opinion whiCh is the fin al source of govement
in a democratic state" I"The primary concern here is with speakers' interests. Audience imerests are prtected t
but only in the
space craeted by the important limitation on th reasols that government may regulae speech. Specific ly, when addressing us as
tie ultimate governors in a democratic society, governmentm ay
not limit speech because itbhelives that this speech will lead Us to
make unnwise or even disastrous sockia policy decisions. Similarly,
irrespective of any mistust of the people's rational abilities or violation of speakers' rights, it would seem that it is impermissiblefor
tie governrment to pribit
speeCh for the specific purpose of
bringing about policy outcomes desired bythe govern ent or to do
so merely to aSSulre that inculm be nts stay n poweri To regu late
anriparerniahismi
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speech for any ' these reasons would violate the core dem cratic
norm ht the people are the ultinate sovereigns.

The precept that the people are capable in their capacities
as

the utinate governors of society to sort out truth fromnfalsity is so
basic that it may even forbid government from banning intentional
lies about political or socal natteSr in order to prevent the people
from being deceived into making an unwise decision."
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in
the absence of the v iolaion of speaker's igh tsis tt impermisible for the government* to tryi to
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tanty however and consistent with the view that hat the Ameican free speech principle derie s from the very ess ence of democracy rather than some broader liberty principle, this strong antipaternalism feature of free speech doctrnne applies only wYhen the
government regulation addresses us qua citizen, not in various
other capactieS, Such as consumer& Thus with respect to ordinary commercial sPeech as well as in a host of olher situations in
which people are considered dependent and vulnerable rather than
independent and rational 67 the First Amendn tln
poses no obstacle
to the governent banning false oi misleading speech.

of FIee Speech Akrms
Cexical orde
Core, SeOndar and Periphel al
It is this individual right s oriented commitment to democratic
self-governance that, in ny view, forms the core of the American
free speech principle. It is properly referred to as the core for
three reasons. First. this norm expla-ins more of te current doetne that does any other contender. In addition, regulations that
offend this norm arc invariably held unconstitutional even i thle
government call show that seriouS har will result if the speech is
left unregulated. But most importantly, the command tht government trea us, in our capacities as the ultimate sovereigns n a
democratic society, as equal and rational agents constitutes a gh
in the strong sense of that tem: an interest possessed by an individual that cannot be violated even on a single occasion because of
tle reasonable or even certain belief that we would all be better off
if this interest were sacrificed.6 8
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Even if there would be a net gain to society (as there might
well be) if people were prohibited from spouting hurtful and offen
Sive racist ideas in public dis,,course, the First Amendment prohibits such a sacrifice of the participatOry rights Of racist speakers for
the greater public good 6 0 Indeed, precisely because each individual in this society has a fre amd equal right to pa icipate in the
discussion by which we govern ourselves citizens in this counry
may vigorously critize governmental or social policy even if doing so causes no just offense and anger, but much more g)ievous
ham. Even if the government could show that the exp\pression of
racist or anti-Semitic ideas in public discourse leads to an increase
in acts of diswcrminat ion or even violence, against minorities or
Jewvs, the First Amendmendt wold still prohibit the governm ent
from punishing this speech so long as it did not directly incite such
illegal conduct.'
Similarly even if' the government could show
that antiwm
ar protests were encourg ing our enemies to fight harder,
and thus weNe likely! to lead to increased deatis of American soldiers on the battlefield, he Firt Amendment would nevertheless
forbid the go0 vernment from stopping these
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Although I believe tha for these reasons that a basic precept
democratic equality and citizen rationality forms the core of thle
American frec speech principle, I do not contend that this precept
tells the whole story. To round out the picture. we have to appeal
to some of the social "wfeconcern s discussed above. But here I
\vant to distingui sh betw e en importnt s ecofndadry values, su'c h aS
assuring the free flow of information needed it make wise policy
decisions, and truly peripheral ones, such as the larger ommitment to the narketplace of ideas.
Although assuring adequate in formnion flo\w is not, in imy
viewacor First Amendment
lue i
e ensejst described, its
relationship to proper functioning i of the democratic process endows it Wth special importance ' Thus the Court has on occasion
protected speech because i provided information needed for informed decisionmaking on matters off public concern, even in the
abs ene of a violation of' solme speaker's participator ri ,ghts.7
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H o\eer, coin fimi ng that law that impede public access to information ncedcd for democratic decisionmaking do not implicate a
core First Amendment right, or indeed a true individual right of
any descriltiol, the Court has, in cases not involving speakecs

with First Amendment interess at stake, often deferred to legislaive conclusions that restrictions on informaion on matters of publieconcern is juStified by some greater social welfare considera-
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Another social welfare concern needed to account for the e
panse of spedch protected under curiri doctrine is a more general
commitment to the marketplace of ideas, encompassing not just
expression on political and social 1atters, but miathematical and
scientific speech as we'L However, although such speech is indeed pr1tected, i receives even less p rotection than information
needed for democratc decisionmakin,g
Thus despite the considerable lip service paid to this norm, a comitment to a divrse
marketplace of ideas is a norm quite distant from the core of the
American 'speech principle.
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COMPETITION LAW TO NIKE'S SPEECH

Now that we have explored both the strUcture Of Ameri!a
free speech doctrine and the Valu es that Underl ieit. we are in a Position to determine: (1) whether C'alifornia's false advertising regime can be constitutionally applied to Nike's spcech; (2) if it can

be constitut ionall applied, whether Nike's allegedly false and
misleading statements are nonetheless entitled to some First
Amendment protection: and (3) if these statements are entitled to
some protection, precisely what level of prtection does the Filt
Amendment demand? The key to answering the firt question is to
inq ie whether in the absence of any First A me nt protection, application of, California's false advertisin g regi me to th is
speec infringes tle core free speech vallues de scribed above. Altho ugh this is a veroy
se and difficult lques,tion, Careful analysis
revals that such application to speech of this sort may well ininge the core precept a th
vernmen must treat citizens as
ration a gents Much More certain is that even if this legalregi me
can be constitutionaly appiied to speech such as Nike's, the California Supreme Court erred in concluding that the allegedlyfalse
and misl1eadin'g statement s in these communications were entlitled
to no Fist Amendmentmprotection. For even if not infringing the
constitutive core of democracy underlying the First Amendment,
in the absence of coniderable First Arriendme rnt protection for any
fsor
isleadilng statements contained in Nike's public communic ations, Kasky's invocation of California's regulatory r~egime
against Nike'S allegedly false and m isleading statements threatens
to both stifle and disIort information needed by tile citizenry to
make decisions on vital matters of public concern. Determining
the precise leel of protection needed to protect thle informilation
flow needed for democratic decisionmaking while not unduly impeding California'S legi timate interest in consu mer protection is a
much more difficult question.
A. DoeiCalifornia'Fe Adeiin Regime 'sJmplicaeCore
Fre Speech Norms as Alfied to Nike, Spec h:)
As a first cut at thle problem, it is worth nloting) that California's legal regime prohibiting false statements that mi ght mislead
consumers in their purchasing decisions is not on its fee offensive
to tihe core free speech norm that pre supposes tihe equality and rationality o f al citizens. As to equality, the laws upon which Kasky
based his suit are facially viewpoint neutral. Section 17200 of
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Ca fornasBusiness
Ti
and Professions Code prohibits "anv unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unflair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advert ising."'I Similarly, section 17500
makes it unlawful for "anyt, person jor] corporatiion" with th intent
o f se lI ing property services to make -any statement" which is "untrue or misleaQdg"i
There is tus no plausible arguintm that in
enacting these laws the California legislature was attempting to
elude some people from speaking becaus e it disa gre s wi th their
worldview.
Such facial viewkpoint neutrality also belies any argument that,
at leat as applied to ordinary commercial speech, the state is prohibiing the spe ch in question because it fears the people will be
persuaded to effectuate some political or social change that the
government thinks is unwise. These laws d, it is true, restrict
speech precisely because of its capacity to mislead people in making a purchase of a commercial pmduct or sevice, and thu, to this
extent, deny the rationality of the listener. But as emphasized
aboveil the core of American free speech doctrine insists that the
government tre us as fully rational agent in our capacity as the
ult imate governors in a detmocracy, not as consuners of comimercial products and services8

Of course,

imay well be doubted

whether even when procesi
informati0 oiln matters o'f pUblic
c0oncern people really are rational agents who can accurately Sort
out truth from falsity. However, rationality in this realm is not a
description, but an1ascription.
In addressingL uIS qua consumner,
i
howen v rte
government may treat as us iin accord with what is
probably a more accurate asSessnent of human ratihality: not
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quite fuill rational beings, many of whom can easily be misled by
fase or evi merely decepti advertising."s
Although the laws upon which Kasky based his sui do not on
their face implicate the core free speech norms of equality aId r tionality essential to democratic se f-go verna nce, it still may be
that their application to Nikes spech in this case does threaten
these norms. Unlike the typical object of'Calitbrnia's false advertising laws, Nike's statements about its working conditions are
inext ricably intertWined" wih a debate on a oatter of public concern. It is not unconmon for tile Court to find that law or regulation uno1jectionable oin its face \iolates the First
sIlendmeicnt
Am'
when applied Io speech on matters of puIblic concern.' The question theretbre becomes Whether, despite the facial idity of the
low, the application of these provision to Nie's speech jeopardizes the core Firi s Amendment norms of equality and ratiOnllity.
Applications of Califo rnia's regulatory schemne to speech on
matt rs of plhic Concern

ould viOlate these core norms in ateast

three ways: (1) byI ffect iely exclUding speakers from the discussion by which public opinion is formed, thereby undermining tie
legitimizing function of free speech; (2) by allowing ideologically
ntivated private citi zens to utilize California's leg al regimlle to
Stitfle Nike's views onglobalization and (3) by paternalistically
protectin the a udie n c fr0 m misleading speech in violation of tle
precept that the ultimaIt governor's in a democracy are rational
aget S.

I. Application o Calibiwlbia's False . dvertiin Regime to Nie's
Speech Does Not Threaien Anyone's Parrticipaioryhacrests
As Robert Post emphasizes, a core function of free speech is
democratic legitimization. A law that either throughdsigor effect prohibits a would-be speaker from participating in the debate
through which public policy is Formed "threaten[s] to alienate citizens from their government." 7 More specifically a person excluded from participating on equal terms with other participants in
debate on a matter of public concern will be less likely to accept
a",t
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the legitimacy of any resolution of that controversy that goes
against his interests. It is for this reason that several Supreme
Court decisions, mostly of an earlier era, invalidated even content
neuoral restrictins that unduly interfered with such participationi. t
A good argument can be made that, in the absence of at least
some degree Of consAtitutional iinmu nity For factual mi sstate ments
Nike might make in its statements about the wAorking, conditions iln
its overseas factories application of California's false advertising
laws will chill its participation in tle public debate about its labor
practices, in particular, and globalization, in general. iideed, here
is evidence that the mere pendency of Kasky's lawsuit caused Nike
to decline to participate further in this debate t It might, therefore, be argued that denying N ike conStitutionlal protection for factual misstatement wil effeCtivey exclude it from parIicipating in
thi s important public debate, thereby imperiling, tihe core legitimization purpose of free speech. There is, holwever, a fatal flaw in
any such argument.
If a regulatory scheme threatened to detre indiv idualcitizens
from participating in a public discussion in hils way, the legitimizing function of1 free speh would indeed be imperiled. Thus, First
Aendmet dotdine Often provides immlunity precisely to asSuI
that individuals can safely participate in public discourse," SimiSe2
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ar immunity would attach to the speech o f advocacy organizations, whose very purpose is to advance the political and social
goals of its members. Unlike individual citizens, however, ordinary bs iness enltities suh as Nike are not the ultim ate SoVereignS
in a democratic society, nor are they entities in need of the legtimizing function of free speech . Indeed, it wouMld mnake no Senl Se to
talk about a business corporation "feeling" that the legalsystem is
illegitimate)! Thus, recent decisions have upheld the ability of
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government to categorically exclude ordinary business corporations from participation in core political speech, an exclusion that
would be unthinkable wit resp tI to an individual citizen wiShiig
to partiCipate in a public debate. 9 '
2. Koslov IInvocation of Califrnia Legatl Reginm Does Not
Constintte Vieipoit iscr-iminaton AttribIuabl to the State
It could be argued that application of California's regulatory
schene to N ike's speech iln this case r ais es the danger of impermnissible viewpoint discrimination. Like abortion, the war in Iraq
and holmosexual marria geeeconomic globalization is an issue that
prvokes political passion. In addition to concern about the alleged exploitation of foreign workers by American businesses,
many Aliericans are outraged that these businesses have exported
jobsIoerseas that used to be held by domestic workers. Untlike the
typical false advertising case, the heated ideological context of this
lawsuit raises dhe possibility that Kasky has hijacked California's
powerful regulatory scheme, not for its le gitimate purp ose 0f prtecting consumers, but to stifle Nike's defense of globalization.
Even in the absence of a speaker with participatory rights, selective suppression b)Y the tt of' informlation onl one side of a social
or political issue so as to bring about a desired political result
would violate the core preceptI that the ultimate governors in a democracy arelthe people, nt the govrmen

IHere, however, it is

not a government agency or a public official, but rather a private
individual who is suspected of invoking a facially neutral regulator ,regime for such ideologically reasons. But in the absence of
some reason to believe that he California legislature d igned this
oft
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scheme, or allows it to continue, with the specific purpose of a]lowing a privane individuals to accomplish something the Consitution forbids the state to due dirk tly, such illicit Imotivationl should
not be attributed to tihe state. AlthoUgh One could imagine a regulatory scheme that fis this description, ' there is no reason to suspect that this was a moivating force for Californa's allowing private individuals to invoke its false advertising laws.
Speech May Violate thc ore Prece ta the Goverment Muhw
Respect the R tionliti of its Ciiizens

A much beter ar-gument that appicationof C alifornia's regulatory scheme to speech on Matters o public Concern inplicates
core free speech norms is that the audience for Nike's speech is
perfectly capable of coming to their own conclusions about
HWhte Nie or its critics I telling_ thle truth abhout w\orkinlg conditions in Nike's overseas factories. And irrespective of whether the
audiewe is in fact capable of such rational ddliberation, in a free
and demtocratic society that audience to who m N ike directed this
speech oin a m1ate of public Concern must be "entrusted With the
responsibility fo judging and ewuating the relativ merits of conf Hicting argumenSt. "S Consequently, the argument Continues, any
attempt by the state to regulate Nike's speech on th s sbject so as
to preCnt this audience from being misled, violates tle basic precept that citizens engaged in debates On matters Of public Concern
are rational agents. Te rejoinder to this argumnt is tat he state
is not prohibiting Nike frOm iSSUing false statements about is
working conditions in order to preven citizeins from forming erroneouS opinions about gl0balization, or even iaiccurate opinionls
about Nike's conduct per se; rather the state is interested only in
the narrower goal of prevnting Nike from uising false or misleading statements to induce ConSuImeS to buy its products
Whether the stat violates the core democratic norm of citizen
rationalit in sekig to prohibit false and misleading statements in
this context is an exceedingly difficult question lying at tle heart
of this case. It is therefore worth conlsidering iln some detail. The
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question is difficudt because Nike's statements are addressed to
people in their status bO as ctizens and consumers. As a resulh,
any attempt by the state to
this discourse of Fale and isleadilgstatetmnt also touChes the audience in its dua capacity as
the ultimaite governor in a democratic .society, whom the very
foulndation' Of denocracy command must be tireated by governm ent as independent and rational agents and as consumers, whom
the Constitution permits the stat to treat as dependent and vulnerH 0w is tis conun drum to be resolved? Altho u gh the dem10cratic aid consumer elements of Nike's speech iay be "inextricably intertwined." one pos sible solution is to try to disentangle the
democratic and consumer aspecs of the vari 0 us d cisions likely to
be influenced by Nike's statements. Under such an approach, decisions or positions taken oi PubliC p0licy iSsueS such a.s the des irability of' laws restricting foreignlabor practices of dOmestic businesses, or even whether t support a boycott of Nike poductis, are
plainly on the democratic self-govermance sd of the lie. In cntrast it cOuld he argued that decisions to p"Irchas a Nike product
that has been influenced by misleading statements shoiuld be put oi
the consumer side of the le. Therefore, the argument continues,
by applying its legal regime to Nike's alleged missiatemenis, the
state here is acting paternalistically only towards tse
vho might
be mislead into purchasing Nike's product, not those who might be
influenced by Ihese same misStatements to take some pos ii o n on a
public policy issue related to working conditions or economic
globali zation. Although the eCM of applying Ciali for nia's rte glhatory regime to speech sICh as Nikes may be t proibi false or
misleading statements relevantt the deliberation of peope in
heir rol as tizen, the stae has noin n to do so Rather, thS
incidental overregulatio occurs only because the spech (though
no0t MCtheeisiuns iFIlenced by that speech) is anl inseparable
amalgamll that m1ight both rmislead consumner" as well as persuadt
people to support or oppose some public policy initiative. But the
core free speech prohibition against the state denyi ng the rat i0naIity of people in their capacities as tihe ultimate governor s in a democracy, is a limition on government puwrpose not the Q/frc of

govenment action.9
The existence of such a clear, legitiiale
consum er-o ri ented rea so n for regulati ng false or misleadi ng statements, the argument concludes, thus dispels the specter ihat the
state's real purpose is concern that the people will be deceived by
&e
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statements into making some erroneous

social pOlicy deci-

Although tie argum nt is superficially appealing, it is ultimately unperSuasive T dIefet in tis argument is that it increctly assumes that the dcision to purchase a Nike product as a
result of Nike's alleged misstatements is purely an econonic deci-

sion with no aspects of democratic deCisionmaking. For the dual
citizen consumer personait of the audie e in this case extends
n0t jLst to audiewe dehibheation, but all the way down to We actual
deision to purche or not to purchase a Nike produc. A person
wvho decides not to purchase Nike pr0 duCt s because media reportS
of Nike's labor practices have persuaded her that Nike exploits
oerseas workers is Surely actin, at leaSt in part, if not primarily,
ii her capacity as a concerned citizen, not just as a potential consumer of athletic vwear. If this person is then persuaded by Nike's
speech in these slme media that the company is not exploitiing its
workers, and for this reason buys a Nike product, she is similarly
acting both as a citizen and a consumer.
If, then, he dc ision to purchase Nike's products aS a result of
the alleged misstateiments contains inextricably linked aspects deIocratic self-governance and ordinlary consuner activit, how is a
co rt to decide w hether the aludi ence to whomi0 these allegedmis
statements were dired should be deemed rational and indep endent citizens or vulnerable and dependent consu mer's? One way to
decide the i,sue is to focus on the format used by Nike to convey
its message . There are two separate, though related, arguments
that caln be made with respect to tle nature of these inedia. The
first is that because the modes of communication used by Nike are
all mediaesseial to democratic selfgoernanceNike's alleged
misstat ements should be presume d to be addressed to a rational
and independent audience. A related arg ulmenit is, that precisely
because of the particular forms of cominnauiication inolved in this
Lve

toi cases s here there is direct evidene of6tl legituimat e purpffo se, the existenc e of a

rebut thie hargetha the stae hias acted trtm
an iegitimate rea 0on.s ii Reiton , Playti me Thea
ters Inc. 47 5 U.S1, 4 59 n.i3 (1986))(lFlrenitii .1 dissenin g) ( docimeni~tinig evide nce of an
i mpetmissSible legislattve pu rpo se of rdin~ance upheld by realor ityli ;I)nited State s , . fJI-nen,
91 US. 67, 382-86 (1968) (explai ning thgat the Court si llnot strike dosCa aaially)cnStit~uiona atut
st c o n the ba~os o a supposed improper! purp!os e); Hone Cr, vhere political seech
cen~ed~ wvith improper govenmiiental motive See e >g. Bdlon, 435 Is at 7 85 86 (in sink
ingdow
xaa bait on state lasw prothibiing buittie sses from mmakhnag expend ituares fo
fipolitiea l
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case the audience is in An likely to be more rational and independent thmn the audience to whom a typical conmercial adMCtisement is addressed.
AS Jus ice Briyer emphasized, the nedia for communication
used by Nike in this case press releases, letters tonewspapes
and ltters to university presidents"" are not typical adverising
formats 01i While commercial advertising can occasionally make
use of such formats (is there any format imun e from such advertising?) tley are m ore often utilized for public policy debate. In
any evenp res releases and letters to the editor re in our societ, modes of communication essential to public discourse and
hence to democratic self-governanceYo
Th e question here is
ethe
use of theSe media requires the conclusion that the
audience of Nike's stateints be considered independent and rational so that any attempt by goverment to keep the audience
froim being misled implicates the cme ratio nality precept underlying the First Amendment.
As Robert Post has written, in modern democracies certain
modes of communication, including those utilized by Nike in this
ca se, form "a structural skeleton that is necessary, although not

sufficient, for public discourse to serve the const itu tional svalue of
democracy. -Ptt Moreover these media *presuppose and embo dy a
certain kind of relationship betwveen speaker and audience [that
104
wel might roughly describe . . . as dialogic and independent.
For this reason it is iasumed that if a medium were constitutionAll protected by the First Amendment, each instance of the medium woul d al So be protected"O As an example, precisely beCause m0ies have been deeied an essential medium of public
iNike also bought fll page edioral adxertigementS" irs several newspapers to publicize
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discourse -courts need not and perhaps should not ask wnhether any1
part icu ir fili succeded in communicating its specific message
AS a formalistic matter, there is good reason to presume that
any particular iessage in a mediu m e sSential t0 demoCratic C0mmunication is in fact par of this democratic dialogue. SUch a presu mp tio n hoth ge nera I Squares wit rea it y, and in addi tion, is
ncessary to the proper workings of democratic self-governan .
Ii the great najority of cases, ony communication in a medium
essential to democratic self-govenance wi ! be imended to coney
information rele ant to democratic decisioniaking. MXIoreover,
regardless of any such intent. the shared social conventions that
establish the MedUM in the fir-st place wiill, with1 respect to any
c0mmuiication, tend to "geneiate forms of human interaction that
are acknoiw Iedge d as 'ideas' within the jurisprudence Of the First
Amendment."
Similarly, for s uch a medium to serve its core
demriocratic Purpose, the audience for any IpartiCular communiCatin in a mediUmIl 1r pUblic discouSe must in accorldance with the
basic precept that the ulidmate SOverceigns in a democracy are rational ageints, be deenied rational. But this presuimptioln is rebutable. For in stance, no First Amendment protecton would be warranted just becauSe tw competitors Shmred price information in a
press release or through a secret coe in a letter to a newspaper.
What bearing should the presumption that an specific communication in a mediu m essential to public discourse is part of
that disCouse hae Oni the question in this Case? It suggests that as
a formal, doctrinal iatter the burden should be oi tho wishing to
apply California's false advertising regine to Nike's speech to
show that despite is
aion to matters ofpublic COncern, Such
speech may nonetheless be rwegulated because it misleads people
into making some decision unconnected with democratic decisionmaking. But because there exists no such purely elcnumic
decisiin severzable from democraic dec isinnia king, under the
us ualaproach to communication inmedia essential to democ aic
self-gLoernance Nike's speech would be considered hghly protected public discourse. While such a fornalist ic: approach is in
accord witl doctrine, and although giving such heavy weight to the
nature of the medium usually serVes free SpeeCh values, in a novel
1 Md
point. Disgpl[tyd in a I il17 NesswY ok ariieXhibititt
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an d difficult case like this it would I beliee, be a mistake to give
decisive weight to the presumption that the speech is public dis-

coursej ust because it utilizes media essential to that dialogue.
It is true, as Post saggests hat once it was decided that movies were an essential medium for democratic seltf-governanceit
Iade good Scnse to presume that any fin is entitled to rigorous
First Amendment protection rather than for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether such protection was warranted.
Still, when tihe question was first rai sed whether hardcore pornographic movies were entitled to such protection, it \would have
been a mistake for the Court to have deciied that such protection
was Warranted just because films a an srential medi um ofpUblic
discourse. By the same token, the novel question presented here
should not be decided solel on the grounds that Nike made use of
a
Imlodes of communication normailly
used for public discourse. In
the absence ol any reason to believe that reglatingspeecsh uIh as
Nike's will threaten the general ability of press releases and letter s
to new spapers to continue to function as an essential mechanism off
public discourse, a more particularized inquiry is warranted.
This is not to suggest, however, that the format for communication used by Nike is irlevant to this inquiry As discussed
ahoVe,_ there is an a Ssumption growing out of the basic denocratic precept of citizen rationality that the audience of media
essential t pubic discourse consist of independent rational
agents involved in a dialogue about how we shlould govern
ourselves, rather than dependent and vulnerable persons addressed
on0ologically. While the. determination for First Amendment
purposes of w het her an aud ienCe mu st be treated as rational is ultimutely an ascription not a description,
controlled in the f inal
analiysis by a o rmat ive co mm itme nt to d e moc r ati c sel fgovernance rather than some empirical assessment the extent that
an audience is in fact rational nonetheless lould have sone
bearing on tihe matter.
And where, as in tlis case, the audience
has aspects of both consumer and tizen, an evaluati6on of the
rationality of the audience targeted by Nike's campaign may well
become tie decisive factor in making tihe ultimate as cription of
t
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press release or in a full page editorial advertisenent, or in a letter
addr sssed to university, presidents and athletic directors, was likely
to accept these assertions without critical inquiry or further inves

tigatio n, much the way the average consumer will accept a claim
on a bag of potato chips that it contains only 2 grams of fat, o an
advertisement in a magazine tt a certain automobile is made in
the United States exclusively by union labor, Or conernsely, as
thiS audienc morelikel Yto critically assess the validity of these
claims in the w"a people ordinarilyitend to skeptically evaluat
statements by one side in a coentious public policy debate, sucl
as whether partial birth abortion is ever medically necessary or
whetheKlaws mandating the issuance of concealed weapons permits leadto a reduction in violent crime?!
In light of both the content and format of Nike's statements,
the most reasonable assumption is that the audience targeted by
Nike's campa ign is in fact as independent and rational as aln audienc e addressed in a public policy debate unalloyed ith comnmercial purpose, such as in the debate about abortion Or gUn Control, in
which the pariceipants make any number of conflicting factual
aims. An asertion in a letter from Nike in a newspaper defending its abor policies or a statement in a newspaper story relating
statements made by Nike in a press release is likely to trigger a
reader's Critical faculties much more than, say, a statement 0n a
package listhing a produCt' s ingredientS Or even an ordinary advertisement in a magazine, newspaper, or television progam proclaiming where and by whona product was produced. In addition, tle content of these satements made clear to the audience
that Nike's claims were in response to :olntrary factual assertions
In short,
made by Nike's critics on matters of public concern.
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consistent with the usuai presumptin about the adience of newspaper articles and letters to the edtor it would appear that Nike's
audience consists of rtional and independent actors engaged in
denocratic dialogue, or at last no less rational and independent
than a tyial audience engaged in public diScourse.
Where, as here, inforinatioln addresSed to an audience is relevant both to democratic decisiomnaking and consu1mer activity a
determination that the audience is likely to be as capable of chitically ehauating this information as it is when addressed purely
qua citizen would seem to argue for resolving the dilemma in favor
of deeming Nike's audience to be rational actor". Such an ascription (informed in this case by a description)0o audience rationality
would almoSt certainly render unconstitutional the application 0f
California':s false adve-rtising regime to speech such as Nike 's :
As a con!sumer protection measure desi gned to regulate o rdinary conmercial speech. California's false advertisin g regin contailns a nunber Of prophylacdc measu
I re s appropriate to the protection ofa dependent and vulnerable audience, bu highly improper
as applied to an ascriptively independent and rational one. TIe
most egoregious example 0 1such inlappropriate overrl-otection is the
prohibition of literally true but "misleadi ng" statem enits. Under
Cali ornia's false advertising regime a "perfectly true" statement
is ationable if 'ouched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer. .1h Prohibiting a literally ire
statement just because it might mislead an audience deemed to be
rational and independent wonuld seem directly at odds with tihe core
precpt that "he people in Our democracy are entrusted w ith the
responsibility for ju,dging and evallulating the relative mnemrit SOf c0nflicting arguments.-t"1 MakiLng mat ters wOrSe. under this reg ime a
nd riesponid to critiim o
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defendant can be found in violation merely because the statement
i likely to mislead a consumer wih no finding that anyone was
actually deceived 1 1 ' The Court' s jur-isprudswe indicates, however, that wtl re spect to statements made to an audience deemreed
rationn and independent sweeping prophyactic measures such as
those imposed by California's false advertising regime are uncons At
uional 1 8 Th us, Iif there is any room for app Iicatio 0of a alse
It
advertisingregime to speech on matters ot public oncern,
the
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sstate (o r privNate plIa intIIiff) wVoulId, at mniII iniu , h ave to sh1ow that
purchasers were actually misled by somc litemlly false statement.'t~
Accordingly, I think that it is quite possible that the Court
w0uld find that application of California's false advertisi ng law to
speeh oni matte rs of Pulhic concelrn such as thoSeaissue here to
be impe rimissibly paternalisic."

In addition to the general princi-
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pies just discussed, ixo specific strands of precede support this
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has found paternalistic rationales impermi ssible even w ith respect
to eOgulation of ordinmry commercial speech having at best a tenu
ous connection to dwmocamic self-governance.
in any event a
finding that the California regime is unconstitutiOnal as appied to
Nike'S allegedly misleading statements because it fails t0 respect
the r itionmlity of the audience to whom Nike directed its statements is, inm view the result that best accords with the values
underlying the Court's free speech urisprudence. In the final
analysis, however, whether
\
app icationo( f Cali fornia's legal regime
to Nike's speech is, in principle, inconsistent with the First
Amlendme nt is an eXt-emely difficIlt (question about which I retain
some doubt,
I wll therefore go on to inquire whether. on the
powr to rgulate econo"micacivJIie
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assumption that the applicaion of Calfornis las
Nike's
speech does not viOlat some core norm, it nonetheless unconsitutionally impinges the important secondar value of assuring that
government does not warp or unduly impede in formation needed
for deiocratic self-governance.
B. Application olcahjbria's Legal Regime to ;Nike I Speech
Vioates an Importnt Secondar Free Seech Norin hy
Unduly Reatricing and Distoirting Injrina(ion
kinlg
lma
Needed Dem ocratic Decisio
Even if California's false advertising regire does not violate
the basic precept that the government mUst treat us as rational
agents when dealing wit us in our- capacity ais citizens, it nionethecless has the potential to threaten the proper functioniong f d emocracy by limiting info rmaiion neaeded by the peopl for making correct public policy decision,S. The record in thi S case shows that,
after this suit was filed, Nike esseOtially stopped telling its side of
the storyin the Public media,
Even
Fi
if it is assumed thaI Kasky's
allegations are correct and Nike's information campaign contains
various false or misleading statementsSnot even Nike's severest
critics contend that every state m ent iln Nike's campaign was false
Or miSleading. Thus Nike s deciSio n not to speak out Of fear Of
incurring liability deprived the Public of potentially useful informIation nIlon only to Nike, or even if known to others, that oly
N ike would have been w ing to incur the expense of bringing to
the public's att ention. As Justice Stevens explained: "Knowledgeable persons should be free to participate in [debate about important publc isSUes] without fear f unfai reprisS t
t is bad enough that the public is robbed of Nike's pe rspective on the diSpute aboUt w0king conditions in its overseas factories. This damage to the public dialog ue on matters o f public Colern is. however, far more extens iv. If Califolrnia's legal regime
is applied to speech on Fatters of public Concern without meaningfu First Amendment constraints, the public will be deprived of
of the power of these Ie
i"respet
by bnsinS! is
!!f
em
in prohbitin false statements
,gtatemeiS to misjead c eo rs Ji isnot clar however, tha this intere s reaalx distinct
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useful information on anl 'umbe

o matters of vital public interest. To avoid liability, businesses ithin California's reglulator y
juri:sdiction will be deterred from makfing an:y factual assertions
relevant to their produt or operations, or anything els"e for that
matter, that a socially conscious consumer might reasonably consider. even w\hen these statements ar pertinent to some important
issue of public concern, As Justice Breyer pointed out: "Numerous mmii including some wo do not belie \ e that Nike has fully
and accuirately explained its labor practices argue that [the California regulatory scheme] will 'chill' speech and thereby limit the
supply of relevant informaion available to those, such as journIlists, who seek to keep the public in formed ab out important public
issues,
Itis no answer that businesses in Nike's situation can avoid
liability simply by making sure that the statements, which will almost always be about matters which they can verify, are accurate.
Fo one, the prohibition applie s not _just to false statements b ut to
misleading ones as well. hk much more difficult for a speaker to
judge w her a literally true statement, particularly one that is
also relevant to a highly charged public policy debate, mighit nonetheless mislead a consumer than it is for i ti determine whther
the statement is litemlly true. Moreover, even with the execise of
utmost care, it is difficult for a large organizaon to always be meticulously accurate even with respect to factual statements about
i operations.
But under the strict liability possibly imposed by
section 17200, even completely innocent factual errors
he
actionable. 2 9 Flnal
a highly charge d political conte xt, there
is reasmo to doubt whether only false statements will be punished.
ESpecially where there is uncertainty about the facts, the fact
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finder's judgment may be influenced by his or her ideological
views.
There are, moreover, several features of the California
legal
regime that magnify its power to deprive the public of information
critical t democratic self-goverance. First, liablity may attach
even if no one actually relied0n tie allegedly false or misleading
statements.
In addition, severe penalties, including disgorgement of money
as a result of the
a,
, acquired
;
131 unla ful conduct, an
injunction against any further v ioations,
as well as a court SUperVised campaign of correctivec advertisin,2'
g
cml b! imposed for
violation of these laws. The California Supreme Court has thus
held that this legal regime should. be given i"t full deterrent force"
to dissuade "the defendant, and similar entities, from engaging in
such practices in the future, 1
Such potent deterrence may well
be justified with respect to oinnary commercial speech unalloyed

With regard to
with a debate on matters of public concern.i
purely commercia speech, an lo s of Potentially useful consumer
information chilled or -corrected" by these laws is arguably more
than offset b the prevention of consumer deception. With respect
to speech that is i wicabl lined to a ontentious policy debate
in contrast. Such strolng7 deterrence threalens to doubly distort tle
public debate on controversial matters. Not only does the availabilit Yof these remeieS deter b u sinesses froi participating in tie
debate, and thereby from sulpplying'_ useful fin formationl, but thle
public discussion will, inl addition, be further slanted in one direetion if businesses who do risk participating in the discussion are
odMerd to engage in corrective" advertising.

Finally, thi s deleterio
cus
ctfie
Oln pUblic discourse is greatly
exacerbated by the ability of any California citizen to enforce this
powerful legal regime acting as a "private attorney general" 1 35
gvrnment
oAhough offcils can abuse legal regimes such as
California's false advertising laws for ideological reasonS, variou S
lCgal and practical checks . I . tend to keep the nergies Of public
enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic
3
harm:""
The private attorney general provision, in contrast, positive invites "a purely ide0lgical plaintiff, convinced that his
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opponent is not telling the truth Iabout some matter of public conlccrn], to bring into thle Courtroom thc kind of political battle better
waged in other forumlls.
The usual requirement in civil litigation that a private plaintiff must be able to pro've that she has in
fAct been damaged by the wrong ful conduct ill serve as a practical constraint against ide1ological misuse of potent lega lregi mes
such as the one under consideration here Without such a requiremen however, there is little to constrain widespread abuseof su ch
legal machinery or its rel potemial to delprive the public ofr ital
in formation On mat ters ofpublic concern.
Mor eover, the ideological misuse of California's anti-false
advertising regime through the private attorney general provision
will do more than just limit the amount of information available to
tIe public t0 form judgments on policy issues. Even more debilt ating to tie proper fufnctionig of de mocratic self-goverance,
su ChIa \ s it
ill select iely sIanIt in formation aailable to the
public. Under current doctrine, the First Amendment pro\ides political activists rigorous protection against lawsuits based on any
false or misleading statemens they may make about a business'
labor practices.
But, when, as happened in this case, a busin e s
responds to these charges, it is subject to the ful rigors of California' s anti-false advertis ing legal regime w ith according to the
Californlia Sup reme CoUt, no First Amendment immuIn ity for false
or misleading statements Such an uneven playing field threatens
to warp public policy debate in two different ways. First, it will
stifle information on just one side of a particular dispute, a
Kasky's lawsuit has dnoe here.
ut more generally, such lawsuits
\it L in tle aggregate, tend to privilege those who fav rNor
more rgulation of businesses and economic affhirs as opposed to those who
favor more business friendly policies, an ideological division that
roughly marks the divide between liberals and conservatives in this
Country, r indeed, between Democrats anld Republicans.
It is one thing for the progressive frtces in society to use lie
democratic process to obtain tough consumer proteetiol laws such
as the false advertising regime at issue here, or to condemn and
even oycott domesticbusineses who, in their view, exploit over"-
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seas wvorkers or rob American wAorkers of wAell paying Jobs. IDepriving the pulic of information needed to make judgments on
these mattcrs, however, subv-erts democracy.
Earlier I argued tha ideooi0cal uSe of (aliforna's false adv'ertisi ng regime by privatecitizen s should not be attributed to the
state.

The viewpoint discrimination I -just described thus should

not be considered a breach of the core democratic norm forbidding
the siat fron fiavoring one side in an ideological battle. But A
tho1ugh not a violationof his core norm because its impetus comes
fron a private party, such iiewpoint discrimination nonethele.ss
results from use ofa state regulatory reg ime n a way that is inimiCal to the proper functioning of.democrac..
Not only does Such
ideological miSUSe Of a powerful regulatory device warp information available to the ciizenry on matters of public concern, it also
tends to fra Ythe comm itnient to fair play and Self-restraint upon
which free and democrattic societies ultimately depend.
I11. DETE RMINING THE PROPER LEVEL OF FIRS'
AMENDMENT PRO TEC(TiON FOR NiKEs SP EECH

If, as 1 have suggested i does, application of (aliforna's
fals1e advertising regime to Nike's speech violates the core precept
0f citizen raionalihty underlyin(g the Firt Amendment, then it can
have no application to such speech. A much more difficult question is what limitations, if any, the First Amendment imposes upon
the operation of Is regimeif s application to this speech does
not violate a core norm, and thus is not in principle contrary to the
First Amendment, but nonetheless impairs the important secondary
value of assuring that government regulatkon does not disort or
unduly impede the information flo\w needed for democratic deliberation. Led astray by the formalism that works well in routine
free speech cases, the C alitfo111a Supreme Court c oncluded that to
the exten it was false or misleadi ng, Ni ke speech was entitled to
no First Amendment protection. As we have just seen, h0wever, if
left unrestrained by the First Amendment, application of California's legal regime to Nike's alleged faCtual misstatements threatens to rob the public of valuable information on matters of public
concern and to do so in a viewp\oint-o)r iented way.
LO:ast In dotrinial terni~S,

ky'S !ioking (:adoi'i

legal eieime to restra in Nikc'i
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Unlik the California Supreme Court's highly tbrmalistic
conclusion that Nike's allegedly false and misleading statements
are entitled to no Firta Amendment protection, Professor Baker
focuses on perinent fre speech values to make an interesting argunent that despite such possile stifling and dist ortion o information, application of California's regime to speech on matters of
public concern should nonetheless be left unconstrained by the
First Aiendment. As do I Profe ssor Baker believes that ordinary
business entities have no First Amendment right to participate in
public discourse.

But Contrary to my vCew (but conSistent w ith

the one I adopt for the sake of argument in this pat of the artice),
he also finds that application of Calitbrnia's regime to Nike's
speech is not impermissibly pateralistic and thus does not violate
the core audience right protected by the First Amnendin)i

41

Ac-

cordin gly, in Baker's view the onlyi free speech values at stake in
this case are various instrumental intere"sIS) 2 Given these premises, Baker concludes that the sta e's interest in protecting "the
itgiyOf' a, discour-se in which people deCvelop their ownl views
on the bais of dialogue with other indiViduals" is a constitutionally sufficient reason to exclude busineiss entities all together, and
thus a fortiOri sufficient to hold themto stfrict standards Of1ruthfulness. lest these entities -distort[] Ithe (constitutionally protected
and valued) dialogue"
Baker admits that such exclusion "might
produce bad co nse qu enices" but ilnsi S that eValuati onS of this type
of trade-off is the normal task of legislative bodWis.-" 4
I generally agree with Professor Baker's view that where only
instrumental Concerns as opposed to core,
individual First
Amendment rights are at stake, the balancing of such social policy
matters should in a democracy beleft to the legislature. Thus I
have previously written that, contrary to the views of several
prominent legal acade mics, the judiciary properly has only an extremely limited role in assuring that speech regulations Such as
intellctual property laws do not impair the diversity of, oices in
the marketplace of ideasi4 This limited judicial role in assuring a
robust, diverS marketplace of ideas derives from the observation,
dealed above, 46 that the marketplace of ideas is but a periheral
concern of the First Amendment. But wlile I am in nearly connote 65.

340Baker, Oupyr?
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plte agreemet with Baker With respect to the proper judicial role
in assuring proper information flow in g enr 4 we part coniay
when it comes to assuring informnation needed for democvratiic dec A
sion maAng. Although this concern may be oily insiriumental and
thus not truly an individual right, and for this rea SOn not a core

First Amendment value, it is, nevertheless, an important secondary
SAlue and One that the judiciary has had t 8 and in my view, should
continue to have, a crucial role in protecting. Unlikc thc authority
fotr blancing genral welfare concerns related to information flow,
assuring tle proper flo of in i ormation needed for democratic deicisionmaking is not a matter over wich the legislature can be
Safely gIven u nreVi ew ab e disco!
Thoret
u gh t he instumental
nature of this concem, and hence the propriety of balancing it
against other social wefahre maitters argues fot a restained judicial
role in this area this consideration does not, as Baker contends,
require complete judicial abdication.
There is, of course, no bright line between information needed
for ordinary social welfarereasons and that required for democi flie small area of. disagr eieent here is tha t 1,see some roon tot a, very limited :judiceial
role ini prti etin g the nar ketplace o6t deas et apar
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But wherever that line might be reasonaratic decisiounnmaking.i
bl y drawn, [i]n the circumstance of our times the dissenmit no of'
information concerning the facts of Nikes overss labor policies
must be regardecd as nformation
neeed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
Period.S we hav e see n, appl ication of California's false adwithOUt any First
vertising regime to speech Such as
Amendment Constrait, is likely to deprive citiensof information
neediedd or appropriate" for democr atic docis ionmnaking as well as
ideologically distIor the availabl informationi' 2 The California
Sup eme C
wuas thereforAe quite wrong to hold that Nike' s allegedly fails or misleading statements were entitled to no First
Amendment protection.
But that still leaves us with the ques"tion of' precisely how\\
much Firt Amendment protection this speech should

be affordied.

Having firmly rejeced t he o ption ofno protection,
e nquickl
rule out the opposite exIreme of absolute immunty or speech such
as Nike's. 3 An individual engaged in debate on a matter of public concern would not be enitled to absolute immunity for fase
factual statements made about a business entity. Rather, such a
critic would m osti kely b e liable r defa ma io or product disparageent if the business cold show that the statenent was made
with knowledge that the statement was
se ortwit h conscious disregard for hether it was true or nOtI 4 It would. therefore, be
anomalous to provid a business entity like Nike with greater protection than an indiv idual who, unlike an ordinary business ntiiy,
has core First Amendment participaory interests that can, in the
absence of adequate immunity be impaire d by de famation laws
and the like. W e are therefmoe left with basically two possibilities:
(1) extremely strong protection such as provided by the New Yk
!O
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Times "malice" standard; or (2) more moderate protection, such
as applied in Ger-tz v,. Robert Welch, Mnc.ltC I believe that this
lesser degree of immunity is the appropriate standard.
No one has a First Amendment right to make a false statement
0 fact e ven while participat ing in pubIic diSco ur se.
I o we er
lest speakers be undWly detered by govmnment regulation from
participating in this discourse in violation of a core norm of participatory democracy the First Amendment provides prophylaxis
for this core norm by allowing speakerS limited inmuiity fromt
pu ishment for making su fa se statements. As discusSd above,
Nike is neither an entity protected by the core equaity precept of
participatory dem ocracy,
nor one capable of being engendered
with the sense of the legal System's legitimacy that such part Cipa
tion pioduces1 5
Accordingly, no level of First Amendment imnU nity, let aloi tihe "nialice" staidard, is warranted to 1pr0t ect
Nike's participatory rig*hts
The conclusion that Nike is not constituti0nally entitled qua
speaker to the protection of tihe "malice st an dard" (ofr any immuv
nity for that matter) does not mean, however, that such rigorous
protection of Nike':s speech is not needed as an inStrmental imatter
to insure tat people are supplied with information needed to ori
sound public policy j udgm7 nts. The criteria for determining as a
Fi rst Amendment Policy mUer What level 0 f protect ion is jU sti fied
are, however' very different from those applied in determining tihe
level of protection warranted to protect iatrue individal right For
if a person hilas
a right, in tihe strorfng sense of tle term, to certain
treatment by governmer,
then the
t
overnment may not deprive
him of that right basedon someultilitarian calculus that society
would be better off if tihe right were violated. Thus if a certain de
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gree of immunity were needed to assure that application of CaOfornia's, regulatory regime did not effectively barn a speaker with
participatory rights from engaging i public discourse on equal
terms with other speakers, ' then it would be improper to weigh
this right to speak against testate s interest in protecti .n
g con sumers froin bein misled. In other words, a right in this sense acts as
a "trump" on even such important state interests as consumer protectionil t Similarly, even tile fear that the people would make
some disastrous social poliMy decision if informai 6on was not kept
secret Could not justi fy restriction on such inlformation62i
In contrast, precisely because the claim that information is
needed to allow people to make wise policy choices is not based
on an indiVidual right, Su Ch utilitarian balancing 0f interests iv
pernissible. If he Speech interest at issu e is not truly an indiv idual right, but merely a particularly important aspect of the public
interest, then there is nothing objectiale aout pragmatically
weighing the public benefit produced by proecting this speech
against the cost to other aspects of the public interest that will
likely be incurred by doing so.
The que ion here thus becomes: What level of immunity best
sti
e balance between tie public's interest il full and fair
access to infoIrmation on matiers of pUbliC concernm Olthe one
hand, and its interest that information that Could rea Sonabl in flu3 on the other?
ence conmrs "flow cleanly as well as freel;
The answer to this question requires difficult emupirical judgments,
as well as a choice between arguably incommensurate values. My
knowledge about the actual ffects of the application of various
levels of free speech immu nit y is quite limited: my practical experience ith false advertising regulation is even more so. Consequently the following suggestions about the prper level of scrutiny are appropriately quilte tenative.
Al things considered, it seems to me that the -malice" stan-

dard offers too much protection to false statements 0 fact for
speech such as is at issue here, and would thus theatn t short-
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change the state's interest in consU me protection. I
For one
thing, unlike false statements made by a citizen about a government official, the statements niade by a business entit about ts
labor practices relate to facts known to it, or which it can readily
ascertain. Additionally, the immunity offered by the 'malice"
standard is in Practice extremely difficult to defeat.'
Finally,
given te enormous financial motivatiOn for busines ses to persuade
the consu ming public that they maintainl safe and fair working
conditions, Or to peIsuade consumers about any other aspect of
their business that miglt affect sales, application of the malice
standard might remoNe too much of the deterrence inp osed by
false advert ising regimes like California's . It may well be that
wihout some substantial deterrence, bu sinesses involved in public
controversies that threaten their sales will ble tempted to intentionally mislead the public. Thus, California Supreme Cou rt Justice
Brown, though vigoro uslydissenting from the mlanjority's refusal to
afford Nike's speech any First Amendment protection, expressed
concern that -an actual malice standard may be too hi gh ..
On balance, a
re linmited First Amendment immunity akin
to that provided under Geri: v. Robert Welch, Inc. seems in order. UInder this standard, a plaintiff cannot reco'ver in a defamation action uless he can show that the defendart was at leastneg
ligent in making the untrue stand
in addition, can
prove that he was actua1 y dam aged by these statements) 9 The
prohibition on liability without fault will ameliorate somewhat the
chilli ng e ffect on speech on matters of public Concern imposed by
potent alse advertising regimes such as California's (which may
wel all
io
mposion of strict liabilit y) °by providing protection
!My as su m ption in th~is pan o6f th~earticle that the ( a ibtornia regi me do es n vio6l ate the
cor~e rioniality. p recp undii
er~lyvingthe lFiist Amienshoient entail thee oncli~on thits~ app0lica-

tiiothis pecha dyane, some legiimiate interest

i

consoe
S
protion
i nun aioiedawit

keepi n g p eo0ple frommaXk' ing bso me un'is politcal{
iede is io n
~l
ternativclyi 1 m ay b e inco0rrec
t!at
it s
bud
espemissi le for (aliform a ply its regimeto speec13,l ta nextic ab
blends asp ets o cm ercial ! peec
;and
pu b lic isoe , eaving the st to re1gua tae thiS
amagamsolon a it does. not?undoly burde: n ilotao needed I ocraidesinak
eeg.
David A\ logan lb
,(
lai in tjhlro lrenries:
lo
iirnit
l e ligo
8
,zibSeq
500 lI[-wonem
(stating
V
to e Yo Ithe
ol
Su1l ir,
aetna
malice standaid wtas claif~tied and rme ,,ers diflitilt to ineef) see a/so W i WAI !!ovds.
1'

!ON t

SiLL
fi{ii

U I Q t LAW tANi
I) 1 li TitU I(

ti AI M

t11 : Ci t

Nt1] K1,2
F [I

Yt
2

8{(1989) (stati ng th!at pub5l ic figur es cl aim they cannt adequatl

tio becas

ma lice stadardFiIpo s
4$ Padat 280isseing..
418 U.S323ml9,4i

"Kasky,

h. iat347T
~l.at 34Y.

a nearly impo ssible burden f pf'i

1At
ti1
1 1tilt1
prtcherrpt

)

CASE WELS[JRN RESERI lA

WR[Vo.44

[\ (11, 5 4: 4

for innocent nisstatements of ft tat ae lkel to be made by a
large orgmization about is working conditos.
t is, Weer the ban on presumned damnges thatwould likel y
provide even nmore potent proection. As we have seen, the private
atorney general provision, which empowers any itizen to invoke
the heavy artillery of California's false adverti sing laws w ithout
alleging haIt she 0r any other p erson vwas actual l y dec e ived,
dmagn ifies thie power of these laws to chil true stateme ntsand to do so in
a viewpoint discriminatory manner. 71 A constitutional requirem1e nit that, with respect to spee on atter of publi concer any
private plaintiff mlust both allege and prove actual reliance and
damtages wvould reduce the in terrorem effect of thislegal regi me
on speech needed by the public. The abilit

of publc olicitals or

.agene. to seek an injunction or even, in an appropriate case, to
require c orrective advertising, should leave tie Califo rnia law with
sufficient deterrence to adequately protect .onsImers.
The on1 disadvantage of pr)viding immunity less protective
than the "malice" Standard is that, in light of the stronger immu nity
for false stat ements enjoyed by critics of a business' employment
practices
the ideological playinzg field will remain uneven,
though less so than if allegedly false or nisleading statements enjoyed no consti onal immunity. To
exten that this greater
immunity is thought necessary to prOtect the participatory rights of
individual citizens, this disparity is a consequence of the basic
constitutional precept that individual citizens, not business entities,
have a righi to denmoratic participation. 7 Inl addition, businesses
criticized fo their Munfair business practices are in a better position
to accurately detrmine the relevant facts than are their adversariecs. F inally), it is, at least arg1uable that thIe po'ssibilIity oFlegal sanictions is less likey to deter businesses engaged in defending thei
business piactices than it is t stife the speech fordinary citlzens
Or eenpo1itical adVOCacy groups. Despitethesemitigating factors, however, it remains a trou ling posSibiliy that providing
businesses with a lesser degree of irminity than their critics will
somewhat distort the debate on iiportant public policY matters
But this potential Cost seenis preferable to tlhcertain emasc u1ation
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of consumer protection that would result if business entities in
Nike's situation were immu ne from false advertisin g s anctions
unless they intentionally made false statements or did so with consciou s disrega,rd of' th Cruth.
t
In sum, while afording Nike's alle.gedly false or misleading
statements G
-like immunity is not a perfet s olution, it seens.
on balance, to be the optimal one.

~CONC

L[JSION

Afa mo
o10gic problem Supposes a Iaver who comes upon
a person standing at an intersection of two roads. The traveler
knows that down one these roads live peple who tell only the
truth, while down the other live people who tell ony lies. The
traveler also knows that the person standing at the ntersection
lives down one of these two roads, but he does not know which
one. The problem asks what one simple (i.e., not compound) question the traveler can ask in order to deteLmine which

road the truth

tells le down. What is tricky (and amusing) about this prOblem
is that de spite many people's intuition that the solution requires
figuring out which category truth teller or lie teller the person
standing at the inersection belongs to, attemptring to so cegorize
I districts from findi ng the correct
the person actua ly
soluion. '
Similarly, formal istically trying to categorize statements standing
at the intersection of ordinary commercial speech and debate on
matters Of public Concern diStracted tihe California Supreme Court
from finding tie correct Solution 0 the problem in this Case. The
proper approac h for a court faed with such a hard case is first to
ask Nwh at free speech values ae implcated by the egulatio of the
speech in question, nid then, based on such a nalyss to categorize the speech in question.
Unlike the traveler in the logic problem, however, we are a llowed to ask more than oneIIquesto6n. So then, it might bhe asked,
how, in tle final analysi should Nike's statements be categorized? So l0ngas it is re ognized that such cateZg orization is a
Conclusion rather than a substitute for analysis of the free speech
value S implicated by California's false advertising laws, there is no
harm in clasifing the speech. Indeed, te usualy belnleficial formalism of free speech doctrine might be ser\ed in doing so. In
any event, if it is true not oy that Nike's speech is an indivisible
nix of speech on maiters Of public concern and C0mmerCial
speech, but also that the decisions influenced by its allegedly false
"1)own which road do you iiv& or~' Iwihich x~ay arc your peopic'~
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ad misleading statements ae similarly an inseparable blend of
democratic decisionmaking and consumer activity, then I think the
speech should be considered public discourse. If, however this
assumption is incorrect, then I think that Nike's statements are better categorized as a highly prot ected form of commercial speech
rather than as a lesser-protected form of public dis course. Specifically, it is commercial speech, but due to its connection \ ith maters of pblic concern i is exepted from theusual rule tat i must
be neither false nor misleading in order to be eligible for the limited First Amendent protection afforded commercial sp eech Put
another way, on the asumpionthat Cliforia
egulatoryregime
does not violate some core free speech norm, it is more accurate to
categorize Nike's speech as beefed Up c0mmerCial speech rather
than pared do ni public discourse. The category of public discOur"se should, in my view be reserved for speech that is truly Constitutive of democracy, either because it involes a speaker's right
to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves, or, even
in the absence of such a Speaker, because the government is restricting infor mation so tie people are not misled into forming
some erroneous beief or mraking an unwise social policy decision.
In coIcIlusion though, I want t0 emphasize that such cate gorization is but an heuristic that is uisefll, perhaps even essential to a
moaturHe free speech doctine in a complex legal system; that it is a
Conclusion, not an argument; and that in alny difficult free sp eech
cases such abstract categorization cannot substitute for careful
analysis of the free Speech Values implicated by the regulation in
question.

